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 Conclusion 
 STRATEGY IN A MURKY WORLD 
 Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro 
 Making national strategy is a byzantine business in the best of times. When dra-
matic events happen, when the international arena is complex and changing, 
when threats and opportunities are uncertain, leaders struggle to understand 
and react effectively. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks of 9/11 opened 
vistas that were unfamiliar and complicated. How did U.S. leaders manage those 
transitions? 
 In this conclusion, we aim both to clarify and analyze what the United States 
did and how it fared during the momentous years that followed the end of the 
Cold War. First, we sketch the evolution of strategy from the fall of the Berlin Wall 
to the onset of the Obama presidency. We then attempt to identify the accom-
plishments and failures of U.S. planning under uncertainty. Finally, we explore 
some of the key impediments to effective strategy-making in times of uncertainty 
and outline what we might learn from the record so that we can do better in the 
future. 
 Recovering the trail of U.S. strategy is no simple task. In the aftermath of 
the Cold War, the complexity and uncertainty of the international landscape 
confounds our retrospective view. We cannot fully re-create the cognitive and 
emotional mind-sets of U.S. officials. Judgments rest on counterfactuals (“things 
could have been different”) that presume a grasp of alternative outcomes that are 
unknowable. So we move forward aware of our own limitations and recognizing 
that we benefit from hindsight. We summarize in broad thematic strokes and 
attempt to glean what we can from the mix of insider information and scholarly 
analysis. 
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 Reviewing U.S. Strategy 
 Despite their limited visibility, U.S. leaders struggled to come to grips with the 
challenges and opportunities created by the collapse of the Wall and the attacks 
on 9/11. What is notable is that the focal point of U.S. strategy did change dra-
matically from the end of the Cold War to the onset of the Obama administra-
tion: failed states and internal governance eclipsed the fears of great powers. As 
dangers and opportunities were reassessed, U.S. officials also reappraised their 
ideas about power and their attitudes toward prevailing international institu-
tions. They developed a growing appreciation of the threats that might accom-
pany the march of globalization and open borders. 
 It has not been easy for U.S. policymakers to think about strategic challenges 
in nontraditional ways. From the time Washington assumed a major role in the 
international arena after World War II, the main threat had been another state 
(the Soviet Union), its lethal capabilities (nuclear weapons), and its hostile com-
munist ideology (“we will bury you”). The crux of American strategy was to 
contain or roll back the Soviet Union, co-opt and integrate former foes (Ger-
many and Japan), and win friends among newly emerging nations in Africa, Asia, 
and the Middle East. In a world that was undergoing dynamic change as a result 
of decolonization and revolutionary nationalism, in a world that had few rules 
and that was infused with ideological conflict, Soviet capabilities seemed like the 
greatest danger to the United States. 
 America’s hope during the Cold War was that growing economic interdepen-
dence, the attractions of a marketplace economy, and the spread of human rights 
and democracy would win adherents to the American way of life and create a 
more stable international order along liberal and capitalist lines. To the extent the 
free movement of goods, money, ideas, and people could be encouraged, there 
was an opportunity to foster a different kind of world. The postwar development 
of Germany and Japan provided a comforting precedent; so did the growth of 
Western European integration and the dynamic advances of South Korea, Tai-
wan, and other Asian tigers, as they were once called. U.S. officials hoped that one 
day perhaps even the Soviet Union or China would follow this same path. 
 The American view in the Cold War was binary: threats emanated from the 
ideological-political-military realm of the major Communist powers; opportu-
nities stemmed from the productivity of the American economy, the strength 
and reach of U.S. military forces, the latent appeal of open trade, the impact 
of the communications revolution, and the lure of consumer capitalism. After 
11/9 and 9/11, policymakers again hoped to capitalize on these opportunities; 
they wanted to persuade other powers to embrace an American vision for the 
international order. Yet they had to grapple with the dangers stemming from the 
globalization of trade, capital, people, and ideas. 
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 1989 
 The immediate challenge facing the United States after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
was familiar to U.S. leaders: they needed to achieve a political settlement in Ger-
many (and Eastern Europe), one that would satisfy the major powers in Europe 
and win approval from their citizens. It was a formidable task, and the U.S. re-
sponse to “1989” represents one of the most notable tactical success stories in the 
history of U.S. diplomacy. Mary Sarotte says it was a “punctuational moment,” 
a time when rapid change takes place and the decisions made shape events—in 
ways intended and unintended—for years afterwards. Robert Zoellick incisively 
recounts how, notwithstanding the pressures of rapidly moving events and the 
demands of constituencies across many countries, the United States was able 
to achieve an outcome unimaginable even one year before: a united Germany 
within NATO. In his chapter, William Wohlforth highlights the magnitude of the 
accomplishment. Most nongovernmental experts, he notes, were critical of the 
policy because they expected that rapid change favoring one side’s preferences 
would produce conflict, but it did not occur. 1 
 Who was responsible for this victory? Paul Wolfowitz argues that Ronald Rea-
gan was the prime agent. He established the conditions that made rapid prog-
ress possible “when the Cold War ice cracked.” Wolfowitz also praises the team of 
George H. W. Bush and James Baker for skillfully handling the inter-allied diplo-
macy, ensuring that the Cold War ended in peaceful and advantageous ways for 
the United States. But success depended on initiatives that went well beyond the 
agreements over the future of Germany and the accords on strategic and conven-
tional armaments. Zoellick usefully underscores these other dimensions of U.S. 
foreign policy—specifically foreign economic policy. Major progress was made 
to promote the free flow of goods and capital—setting the parameters that would 
lead to NAFTA and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. These 
efforts, Zoellick asserts, nurtured domestic support for international engagement 
and encouraged liberalization of the international economy. Although this trajec-
tory had long been characteristic of U.S. policy, officials responded to the new un-
certainties in the world arena after the Wall came down by accelerating their efforts 
to promote economic interdependence and to spur the pace of globalization. 
 But it is not clear that foreign economic policy was integrated in a purposeful 
way with either the security architecture of Europe or a post–Cold War military 
strategy. Zoellick rightly emphasizes the consensus among U.S. officials on the 
desirability of economic integration. They believed that integration would fos-
ter economic growth, stability, and democracy (as it had in Western Europe). 
Policymakers in the Pentagon, such as Wolfowitz and Eric Edelman, shared these 
views. But security and economic planning after 1989 nonetheless moved on two 
different tracks in response to different pressures and events. 
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 Officials also faced a clash between long-term opportunities and immediate 
demands and risks. U.S. decision makers after 11/9 passed on opportunities to 
create new international institutions that proponents thought would be better 
suited to deal with the evolving nature of international politics. They did so be-
cause they believed that prevailing institutions such as NATO could help absorb 
and anchor a united Germany, preserve America’s role in Europe, reassure al-
lies, and allow the United States to manage the immediate aftermath of 11/9. 
Although this orientation seemed wise in 1989 and 1990, it appeared less so with 
the passage of time. After 1991, reforming and enlarging NATO mostly exacer-
bated relations with Russia, a formidable former enemy whose partnership was 
now desirable in order to build a Europe whole and free as well as to manage 
other problem areas such as the Middle East and Central Asia. 
 John Ikenberry, a well-known political scientist, has argued that after major 
victories and in times of flux it is in the interest of the United States to remake 
existing institutions. 2 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth have asserted that 
the United States could and should have used its position of primacy to be more 
activist in creating and shaping international rules. 3 These views echo the words 
of Douglas Hurd (foreign secretary of Great Britain from 1989 to 1995) who 
noted that after 1991 the United States forfeited an ideal opportunity to “remake 
the world, update everything, the UN, everything.” 4 
 In chapter 1, Mary Sarotte reiterates this viewpoint. She points out that the 
United States made a conscious choice to preserve existing Cold War institutions 
rather than create new ones, as leaders had done after 1945. The United States 
might have tried to integrate the Soviet Union into the West, perhaps through 
a collective European security architecture. Failure to do so, Sarotte maintains, 
had serious consequences. Citing the  9/11 Commission Report, she identifies the 
rigidity of Cold War institutions and thinking as one of the causes of U.S. vulner-
ability to the terrorist attacks in 2001. 
 Of course, at the time, the advantages of alternative approaches were not 
self-evident. Zoellick notes that new institutions—especially “third way” ones—
might not have been popular or efficacious in the rapidly evolving international 
landscape after 1989. Yugoslavia began to unravel, and vicious ethnic conflict 
threatened to destabilize Europe. And at the same time, Iraq invaded Kuwait. 
Suddenly, the attention of Bush 41 officials gravitated to questions of internal 
governance in failing states and to regional stability. They had to decide whether 
to assume the burdens of nation-building in the Balkans and the Middle East, 
whether to use their counterattack to defeat Saddam’s army, march to Baghdad, 
and tackle the problems of an ethnically and religiously divided Iraq. Bush and 
his advisers hesitated to do so. They were not ready to reshape societies they 
knew little about or abandon the tried-and-true mechanisms like NATO that had 
served the United States so well for so long. 
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 The Aftershock of 1991 
 The repercussions of the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 revealed an ill-defined U.S. architecture for global affairs. The American 
people clamored for cuts in the military budget and for relief from the oner-
ous obligations of the Cold War. Improvising as he went along, Bush 41 her-
alded a “new world order” and tried to act collaboratively with other countries. 
In thwarting Saddam Hussein, he opted to go to the United Nations for approval 
for the war, worked closely with the Soviet Union, put together a huge coalition 
including major Arab nations, and decided not to seize Baghdad or seek total 
victory. He was trying to foster principles such as multilateral cooperation, part-
nership with the Soviet Union, and great power self-restraint. 5 
 The main strategic planning effort that occurred after 1991 was the crafting 
of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). As Eric Edelman and Paul Wolfowitz 
recount, this was an attempt to anticipate the emerging post–Cold War world 
and adjust to it. Their final report, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional 
Defense Strategy,” delineated the many requirements to meet the new enemy—
President Bush called it “unpredictability.” 6 The authors of the DPG emphasized 
the need to safeguard U.S. primacy in international affairs and the importance 
of configuring forces to meet uncertain but inevitable crises that would erupt 
in regions of the globe deemed vital to U.S. interests. They also stressed the sig-
nificance of integrating former Communist countries into a community of de-
mocracies, the benefits of free trade, and the salience of a U.S. “forward presence” 
to thwart the possibility of nationalism and militarism reemerging in Germany 
and Japan. 7 
 Although Wolfowitz and Edelman vigorously and insightfully rebut many of 
the clichés that have surfaced about the DPG, the planning exercise highlighted 
a dilemma that confronts leaders in time of uncertainty: how to deal with well-
known threats from the past and at the same time identify new ones lurking in 
the unfamiliar international landscape. In fact, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, new threats in the altered strategic environment were not identified, es-
pecially the dangers emanating from failed states and nonstate actors. Planners 
focused on state threats—especially from countries with significant power po-
tential in regions of vital importance—and worried about the eventual recon-
stitution of Russian power. In writing the DPG, they displayed more concern 
with states that had power, even if they had good intentions and were U.S. al-
lies (Germany and Japan), than with nongovernmental actors who wanted to 
harm the United States. Wolfowitz and Edelman, in fact, make an important 
contribution to our understanding of the DPG when they stress that U.S. plan-
ners believed that sustained defense spending was needed in part to dissuade 
Japan and Germany from remilitarizing. Nonetheless, Edelman acknowledges 
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that “the document can be faulted for not sufficiently anticipating the danger 
of Islamic extremism, state failure, and terrorism.” 8 The same can be said about 
their Democratic successors. 
 U.S. policymakers not only had to deal with a rapidly changing international 
landscape, but also with a volatile domestic political scene. The salience of do-
mestic politics was highlighted when James Baker resigned from his position as 
secretary of state and became White House chief of staff in August 1992 in order 
to manage George H. W. Bush’s presidential reelection campaign. Zoellick de-
scribes how Baker tried to forge a campaign plan that “linked America’s foreign 
engagement with domestic interests.” 9 He failed: voters focused on the domestic 
economy and Bush 41 was defeated. 
 The end of the Cold War sundered whatever bipartisan consensus still re-
mained on foreign policy. 10 Thereafter, vicious partisan conflict hindered the 
ability to plan coherent national strategy. The opportunity to forge new global 
principles, treaties, and organizations compatible both with American traditions 
and new global realities was lost. 
 Democrats in Charge, 1993–2000 
 For the incoming Clinton team, “the world looked remarkably benign in January 
1993.” 11 But in an era marked by unipolarity and globalization, the international 
environment presented enticing possibilities as well as formidable challenges. 
The new administration decided to assign priority to encouraging democracy in 
Russia. In his chapter, Walter Slocombe recounts how the linchpin of Clinton’s 
strategy—America’s relationship with Russia—was really an effort to shape its 
internal political character. The goal was to encourage Russia to become a market 
democracy that would be a congenial and reliable international partner. 
 This objective, however, clashed with another U.S. priority, one that was also 
related to internal governance and geopolitics: the enlargement of NATO and the 
democratization of Eastern Europe. Many Russian leaders deeply resented the 
extension of NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact countries. They saw it 
as a violation of agreements signed at the end of the Cold War—a claim that was 
not inscribed in any legal document, but that was understandable in view of the 
conversations that had taken place in February 1990 between Baker and Mikhail 
Gorbachev and between Gorbachev and German chancellor Helmut Kohl. 12 The 
United States and Russia also parted company over the intensifying conflicts in 
the Balkans. 
 The Clinton administration in effect was adopting the basic strategy devel-
oped after the fall of the Wall. This policy was designed to help Russia’s leaders 
as long as they acquiesced to U.S. preferences in world politics. The Clinton team 
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wanted to avoid a Russian nationalist backlash against that policy. Yet the pur-
suit of a winner-take-all diplomacy and the existence of a populist tide within 
the newly democratic Russia ensured strategic failure. Conditions ripened for 
an entrepreneurial Russian politician to exploit popular passions and resent-
ment against U.S. policy. Vladimir Putin, an intelligence service bureaucrat, be-
came that politician. By pursuing a total victory after 1989–90, the United States 
sowed the seeds of confrontation that would take root and grow over the next 
ten years. 
 As Slocombe notes, Clinton’s Russia strategy was coherent. The president was 
personally engaged and he assigned resources to its achievement. Moreover, the 
strategy helped sustain a number of diplomatic successes, including the enlarge-
ment of NATO and the resolution of the Balkan wars. Yet, ultimately, the difficulty 
of reforming Russia’s internal governance, the clash over NATO enlargement and 
democracy promotion in Eastern Europe, and the unreliable Boris Yeltsin under-
mined the central goal of the administration: a long-term strategic partnership 
with America’s former foe in pursuit of a Europe whole and free. 
 9/11 
 By the time George W. Bush was elected president, his advisers were beginning 
to recognize that political instability abroad, even in smaller states, was a major 
challenge for the post–Cold War era. As Philip Zelikow recounts, in the summer 
of 2001—before 9/11—National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice began draft-
ing a national strategy with the premise “that in a globalized world where great 
power rivalries were fading, the main problems would come from states implod-
ing from within.” 13 This, of course, was a distinct change from the “no nation-
building” rhetoric of the campaign as well as from Rice’s summary of Bush’s 
campaign philosophy in her 2000  Foreign Affairs article in which she had empha-
sized the need to focus on great power rivals and the importance of alliances. But 
in July 2001 she was not yet grappling with strategies to reconstitute failed states. 
Even today, these many years after 9/11, U.S. officials are still struggling to design 
capabilities and policies to deal with this challenge, for example, the development 
of counterinsurgency forces within the military establishment and the design of 
governance-building capabilities within the State Department. 
 The attacks on September 11, 2001, like the fall of the Berlin Wall, shattered ex-
pectations and impelled new thinking. The international landscape, however, was 
no longer one of geopolitical possibility (like after 11/9), but fraught with peril 
emanating from nonstate actors. Suddenly, a problem that had been simmering, 
but had not been embraced as a top challenge by the George W. Bush administra-
tion, now shaped its entire global outlook. In Rice’s 2000 article, “terrorism” was 
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mentioned only three times, all minor asides. But she was not alone in slighting 
this threat. Subsequently, the 9/11 Commission would call this neglect a “failure 
of imagination”—an inability to think beyond a Cold War mind-set in a new 
environment. 14 
 Bush and his advisers effectively managed the immediate aftermath of the 
attack. Even as they struggled to make sense of what occurred, comfort the be-
reaved, reassure the public, overcome their own humiliation, and seek revenge, 
they successfully identified al Qaeda as the key source of the 9/11 attack. They 
admonished the Taliban government in Afghanistan that it must expel the ter-
rorist organization from its territory or face war. When it refused, U.S. officials 
quickly took action, routed the Taliban forces, and sent al Qaeda members fleeing 
for safety. As Zelikow notes, this reactive effort was at times chaotic and ad hoc, 
but it worked. 
 The record of the United States’ medium- and longer-term approach to the 
post 9/11 world, however, was more mixed. On the positive side, the United 
States continued to expand trade and promote economic liberalization, themes 
of all post–Cold War administrations, but goals that could easily have been sub-
limated in response to fears about globalization in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. 
Zoellick shows how those efforts in the Americas, in Asia, and elsewhere served 
U.S. interests. 
 In political-military terms, however, many of the scholars here argue that U.S. 
officials erred. Policymakers attacked Iraq without first addressing the unstable 
situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan and without preparing effectively for the 
management of a postconflict Iraq. John Mueller contends that Bush administra-
tion officials (like their predecessors during the Cold War) exaggerated the threat 
and clumsily framed the problem as a “war on terror.” Odd Arne Westad says that 
they learned the wrong lessons from the past. Bruce Cumings believes that they 
could not escape their hardened mind-sets. 
 Pathologies of Uncertainty 
 Notwithstanding these criticisms, the chapters in this book demonstrate that the 
United States effectively shaped and adapted to parts of the new environment 
spawned by 11/9 and 9/11. Real achievements and partial successes should not 
be ignored: the reunification of Germany within NATO; the rollback of Saddam’s 
armies in the Gulf War; the reorientation of strategic thinking; NATO enlarge-
ment; an end to conflict in the Balkans; and the defeat of the Taliban. But there 
were shortcomings as well: opportunities were missed to create and reform in-
ternational institutions; political, military, and economic initiatives were not well 
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coordinated; the dangers emanating from failed states, nonstate terrorists, Islamic 
fundamentalists, and Russian revanchists were not sufficiently understood. 
 How can we account for the failures or inadequacies of strategic planning? 
Insightful recommendations for the future depend on analysis of past problems 
and achievements. Extrapolating from the chapters in this book, we can group 
the main impediments to high-quality planning into five categories: nearsighted 
vision, faulty assumptions, domestic priorities, bureaucratic infighting, and pro-
cedural shortcomings. 
 Nearsighted Vision 
 Overall, U.S. policymakers did reasonably well in responding to the immediate 
challenges faced in the wake of both 11/9 and 9/11. This is true in two senses. 
First, desirable outcomes were achieved, at least initially: Germany was unified 
peacefully within NATO and the Taliban and al Qaeda were defeated in Afghani-
stan. Second, as Wohlforth points out, actions by government officials were dif-
ferent than those proposed by knowledgeable nongovernmental experts and the 
outcomes were better than many independent scholars predicted. 
 The record for the medium term and longer term is less impressive. Although 
we see things more clearly after the fact, there was too little focus on and analysis 
of emerging and foreseeable problems such as a revanchist Russia, the fallout 
from failed states, the rise of terrorism, and the tribulations of postwar Iraq. Out-
side experts (who generally have a bad track record on short-term choices and 
consequences) displayed a much better understanding of these matters. 15 
 How can we account for this variation in outcomes? Wohlforth suggests that 
information and cognitive style make a difference. The pace of change in Europe 
was startling in the fall of 1989 as were the pressures to respond to the 9/11 at-
tacks. Wohlforth’s analysis proposes that U.S. officials may do better adjusting 
to immediate dangers and opportunities because they have fresher and more 
complete information than their counterparts in other countries (and more than 
nongovernmental experts). When officials plan for the long term, however, they 
face more uncertainty and, therefore, immediate access to information and re-
sources are less decisive. It may also be that the scholarly experts’ hedgehog style 
of deductive reasoning is more appropriate for designing longer-term strategy 
than for handling immediate crises. 
 Another possible explanation for the difference is that short-term success 
has a blowback effect that impairs longer-term results. Immediate success leads 
to overconfidence, dangerous risk-taking, and insufficient attention to newly 
emerging problems. Gorbachev’s willingness to go along with U.S. desires, for 
example, may subsequently have encouraged American policymakers to believe 
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that the Russians would bend to U.S. determination. Likewise, in the Bush 43 
administration, the early success in Afghanistan, according to Zelikow, became 
“a stimulant to action” that “loosened inhibitions about experiments with new 
ideas.” This dynamic encouraged the United States to invade Iraq, an operation 
that had previously been deemed too risky. 16 
 Sarotte raises another possible answer. Perhaps it is the case that governmental 
leaders need to react to immediate challenges and, having done so, those choices 
make it much harder to go in a different direction at a later time, even if it seems 
desirable to do so. Bets have been made, reputations staked, and conditions no 
longer invite big changes. 
 In these accounts, government officials, in effect, may behave like corporate 
leaders: the desire for short-term returns may crowd out optimal longer-term 
strategy. 
 Faulty Assumptions 
 Several of the contributors believe that the problems the United States encoun-
tered were due to assumptions from U.S. culture or lessons derived from experi-
ence that diminished the U.S. ability to read situations accurately. In his analysis 
of why the Iraq War went so poorly and why the United States got mired in 
Afghanistan, Westad argues that American leaders “misinterpreted the societ-
ies into which they intervened and overestimated the U.S. capacity for forcing 
change.” 17 They were wrong, in Westad’s view, because U.S. decision makers op-
erated according to a set of lessons about interventions and political change that 
came from the Cold War in Europe, but did not apply to the situations in Iraq 
and Pakistan. If U.S. officials had assessed the conditions on terms appropriate 
to the cultural and geographic context of Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, 
they either would not have intervened (Iraq) or would have done so differently 
(Afghanistan/Pakistan) and with better results. 
 Lack of understanding, Slocombe argues, is not always the problem and was 
not the central cause of the Clinton administration’s troubles in its Russia policy: 
“Knowledge of Russia was greater than that of the Balkans, the Arab world, North 
Korea, or Afghanistan.” If there was a flawed understanding at work, it was a 
general one about how easy it would be to influence another country’s internal 
political and economic order in an era of American dominance. “It is very hard 
for outsiders to shape a basic transformation in attitudes and practices in a for-
eign society and culture.” 18 
 Bruce Cumings also believes that the ways policymakers encounter an un-
certain world are bounded by systems of axiomatic presuppositions that skew 
their understanding and action. If states respond to crises with “what is on the 
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shelf,” then leaders respond to crises with what is in their head. 19 Both Acheson 
after World War II and Bush 41 after the Berlin Wall came down were driven by 
an uncritical belief in the importance of an open, liberal world economy for U.S. 
well-being; the interventions after 9/11 were molded by flawed presuppositions 
from the post–World War II era about the appeal of freedom, the efficacy of force, 
and the success of military occupation (in Germany, Japan, and South Korea); 
and estimates of North Korea’s demise have been consistently wrong because 
they are not based on an understanding of Korean history and culture. 
 A clear vision of the future demands an unbiased analysis of current and 
emerging conditions. Such an analysis, according to Cumings, is impossible. U.S. 
officials cannot help but err; success is accidental. Westad’s analysis is more hope-
ful. Intelligent extrapolations, he suggests, are possible if situations are better 
understood. 
 John Mueller describes a different phenomenon that has haunted U.S. strat-
egy in times of uncertainty: the need to conjure an existential threat. In his view, 
the United States goes in “quest of monsters” that do not exist. After 1945, it 
was global communism; after 1989, it was proliferation of nuclear weapons; and, 
after 9/11, it was global terrorism. In all cases, the threat was exaggerated beyond 
realistic proportions, causing a pervasive and unnecessary sense of insecurity. In 
this view, the U.S. approach to uncertainty is addicted to threat mongering and 
war making except in rare circumstances when the adversary’s toughness (for 
example, Vietnam) chastens policymakers (and the American people)—until 
they forget. 
 Domestic Priorities 
 When the international arena is opaque, domestic political priorities can loom 
large in the making of U.S. strategy. From the day the Berlin Wall came down, 
domestic opinion figured prominently in shaping the actions of U.S. leaders. 
 Bush 41 immediately recognized that in the aftermath of the Cold War new 
dangers loomed: the U.S. public might no longer support large defense expendi-
tures and the United States “forward defense” strategy might have to be reversed. 
The specter of American isolationism reared its ugly head once again. Bush’s 
solution was to embed the newly unified Germany inside NATO, an institution 
that required a continued U.S. presence in Europe. 20 
 In chapter 2, Robert Zoellick notes that a motive for the U.S. pursuit of re-
gional cooperation in Asia in 1989 was “to counter a potential resurgence of U.S. 
economic isolationism.” 21 Successful strategy, he stresses, had to be “connected 
to the ‘Home Front.’ ” 22 The American people needed to be shown that U.S. inter-
national activity helped further U.S. jobs, competitiveness, and values. “Without 
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public support, any U.S. administration will not be able to maintain a strategy of 
global American engagement.” 23 
 Concerns about domestic support not only revolved around foreign eco-
nomic policy; they were focused on the heart of U.S. power abroad: the defense 
budget. As Wolfowitz and Edelman recount, the original impetus for the Defense 
Planning Guidance process was to provide the United States with a compass in 
the wake of the Cold War. But they also stress that the planning document was 
an effort to fend off calls for even greater cuts in the defense budget by legislators 
who no longer saw dangerous threats in the world. 24 
 When the Clinton administration had to choose between the possibility of 
alienating Russia through NATO enlargement and the certainty of alienating do-
mestic constituencies with ethnic roots in the countries of Eastern Europe or in 
the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the president and his advisers 
decided to assign priority to enlargement. They did not want to lose voters who 
were critical to reestablishing and preserving a Democratic coalition that the 
Republicans had undone in the 1994 congressional elections. 25 
 John Mueller’s chapter does not explore deeply why threat exaggeration oc-
curs. To the extent it does happen, leaders may be attempting to mobilize against 
imminent threats that they believe would not be countered effectively in the 
absence of public alarm. 26 But leaders may also be manipulating threats to in-
crease their domestic political popularity and to achieve their domestic political 
agendas, as many allege Bush 43 tried to do and as often was the case during the 
Cold War. In other words, strategy under uncertainty may be shaped as much by 
domestic politics as by the evolving international landscape. 
 Bureaucratic Battles 
 From the view of Washington insiders there is one central factor that shapes the 
way that the United States responds to the external world: the struggle for influ-
ence among competing bureaucracies and policymakers. Such dynamics haunt 
the dreams of those who aspire to integrate national strategy. 
 Differences in opinion across bureaucracies, leaks to sabotage plans, hesi-
tancy to voice opinions, and enmity among top decision makers shaped the 
ways in which the United States adapted to the post–Cold War and 9/11 worlds. 
Even in the Bush 41 presidency, an administration renowned for its relative 
cohesiveness, the Defense Planning Guidance was almost gutted by a leak that 
revealed a preliminary and yet to be vetted draft. Edelman calls it “particularly 
vociferous bureaucratic infighting” that in part was fueled by a policy dispute, 
examined by Wolfowitz, between Defense and State over Ukraine leaving the 
Soviet Union. 27 
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 Philip Zelikow recalls that the start of the Bush 43 administration was “frac-
tious” and encouraged “factional rivalry.” 28 Bush’s style was that of the business 
manager who allocated authority to particular bureaucracies depending on the 
issue. Decisions were made in different subunits with limited coordination. The 
vice president handled some matters, Defense others, and the State Department 
had its portfolio. But there were poisonous relations among top officials, and 
incessant interlopings across bureaucratic boundaries. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell and CIA director George Tenet struggled to preserve the autonomy and 
influence of their organizations while National Security Adviser Rice tried to 
safeguard her special relationship with the president. The famous National Se-
curity Strategy of 2002, in fact, was drafted by Rice, assisted by Zelikow working 
as an outside consultant, and had little input from the neoconservatives in the 
administration. 
 Zoellick’s integrated strategy was not coordinated across the bureaucratic 
landscape of Washington. It was coherent in his own mind but he was not in-
clined to lay it out in a strategy statement. Pragmatic, experienced, and skill-
ful bureaucratic players such as Baker and Zoellick were not prone to spend 
their time writing elaborate strategy papers, nor was it part of the culture of the 
State Department to generate a fully worked out strategic plan for a new world 
order. 29 
 In all these cases, the response to complex rapid changes in world politics 
was molded by intragovernmental bickering and maneuvering. In most cases, 
bureaucratic conflict was a formidable impediment to integrated strategy. 
 Distorted Process 
 Scholars can imagine an ideal scheme for how U.S. strategy should be made in 
changing and uncertain circumstances. The president convenes a group of the 
nation’s top foreign policy officials such as the heads of the NSC, State, CIA, 
Defense, and Treasury. They are tasked to gather information and formulate a set 
of options across policy domains (economic, military, diplomatic, intelligence, 
and so forth). A well-greased interagency process then reconciles divergent views. 
After weighing costs and benefits, risks and opportunities, officials present the 
president with alternative strategic options. The president then selects the most 
effective overall strategy for immediate and continuing challenges. This strategy 
is communicated to the bureaucracy, the country, and the world (as needed) to 
guide the various efforts (departmental, regional, functional, international, and 
so forth) that constitute the nation’s foreign policy. 
 In reality, U.S. foreign policy often strayed considerably from this ideal as lead-
ers confronted tumultuous times and faced a murky international arena after 
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11/9 and 9/11. The record reveals a planning process that involved both rational 
routine and ad hoc artistry. The actual day to day policymaking was at times 
coherent and well managed, as seemed to have been the case during Brent Scow-
croft’s tenure as national security adviser during the Bush 41 administration. 30 
Managing day-to-day policy, however, is different than long-term strategic plan-
ning, which requires presidential input, good personal relationships across bu-
reaucracies, excellent intelligence assessments, and visionary thinkers as well as 
policy entrepreneurs who are able to seize the opportunity and guide issues in 
one direction or another. 
 In the period after the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the core of govern-
mental planning was a group of decision makers in the State Department under 
Secretary Baker and in the NSC under Brent Scowcroft. People such as Zoellick, 
Robert Blackwill, Rice, Robert Hutchings, and Zelikow mapped out the options. 
They had thought about alternative scenarios. Some contingency planning for 
the breakup of the Soviet Union seems to have been done in a secret task force 
headed by Rice (who was in charge of Soviet and Eastern European affairs for the 
National Security Council) in the fall of 1989. 31 Laggards in the process included 
Cheney in Defense and Robert Gates at the CIA, both of whom were skeptical 
about the quick deal making with Gorbachev. The administration, however, de-
cided to increase the pace of diplomacy in order to bolster Gorbachev’s stature 
inside the Kremlin, but also to prevent him from seizing the initiative. 32 Close 
relationships between Bush and Scowcroft and Bush and Baker enabled officials 
in those organizations to shape short-term outcomes in timely and competent 
ways. 
 Longer-term planning in the Bush 41 administration, to the extent it occurred, 
took place in the Pentagon. The president and his national security adviser were 
not inclined toward strategic thinking. As Edelman writes, they “lacked the incli-
nation to engage in speculative ‘grand strategy’ or the ‘vision thing’ . . . they had 
minimal interest in the debate over a new strategy.” 33 Spurred by the Persian Gulf 
War, Bush and Scowcroft did reflect on general principles for a “new world order.” 
They wanted to act in ways that fostered cooperation with the Soviet Union, en-
hanced the legitimacy of international institutions and rule of law, and preserved 
old and new alliances and coalitions (for example, by not marching to Baghdad 
to overthrow Saddam). 34 But they had little patience or interest in putting their 
ideas on paper in a systematic way and communicating them to the bureaucracy 
and the world. 
 In the meantime, officials in the Defense Department went to work on a docu-
ment that would provide direction for the contraction, reconfiguration, and use 
of U.S. military forces. Their plan, as described by Edelman, was more than simply 
military guidance. It incorporated the same “geoeconomic” assumptions that were 
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then shaping Zoellick’s thinking in the State Department, but the ideas of State 
and Defense officials were not joined in a single document. 35 As Wolfowitz notes, 
“the Regional Defense Strategy was not a grand strategy.” 36 Department of De-
fense officials were not inclined to share their work with other departments. When 
it was leaked, it caused consternation in the White House. The final draft of the 
DPG was never championed by the White House. It was released by Secretary of 
Defense Cheney at the very end of the Bush 41 administration in January 1993. 
 The Clinton administration lacked a strong strategic focus. To the extent it 
conducted grand strategy, it did so out of the White House. Clinton wanted an 
overall approach to the world, but he was not disciplined enough in his own 
thinking and leadership style to make it happen, and the world was too compli-
cated. 37 Slocombe shows that the administration did have a strategy at least in 
one area—Russia. Again, the development of this strategy built not on institu-
tionalized process but on circumstances surrounding the fact that the president 
was a college friend of his main Russia adviser, Strobe Talbott, the deputy sec-
retary of state. Otherwise, Clinton and his aides embraced much of the military 
strategy and many of the same geoeconomic assumptions of their Republican 
predecessors. 
 Bush 43 was intent on avoiding the critique of his father for lacking “the vi-
sion thing,” but floundered until the attacks of 9/11. He possessed a different 
approach to policymaking than his father. The president’s preferred CEO man-
agement style positioned his key advisers like “the heads of the subsidiary com-
panies seeing themselves less as part of a team, more as executives with their own 
responsibilities to discharge.” Although Bush may have been seeking a “team of 
rivals,” he encouraged unruly competition. Effective strategic planning in such 
a framework was impossible for Rice to orchestrate. 38 The immediate response 
to 9/11 was generated by an ad hoc group dominated by officials in the Defense 
Department, the CIA, and the Office of the Vice President (at least insofar as Af-
ghanistan was concerned). This group remained at the heart of efforts that would 
lead the United States into Iraq, but, paradoxically, this was not the group that 
authored the notorious 2002 National Security Strategy statement. 
 Zelikow describes how that long-term strategy was developed within the Na-
tional Security Council under Secretary Rice and her outside consultants (es-
pecially Zelikow himself ). The coordination between the war planning for Iraq 
and the overall strategy was not tight. Nonetheless, the immediate demands of 
the situation (the desire to remove Saddam Hussein) shaped the drafting of the 
broader National Security statement, for example, the emphasis on preemp-
tion versus prevention. The strategy statement was a relatively consistent and 
coherent vision of overall strategy, but Zelikow also argues that it reflected the 
 exigencies of the moment. 
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 The record indicates the absence of a standard process for interpreting dra-
matic change and reacting to it. Although administrations were configured simi-
larly, officials came together in different ways depending on the predilections of 
the president, the expertise and inclinations of his chief advisers, and the rela-
tionships among them and their subordinates. 39 The classic model of hierarchical 
and integrated policymaking captures only a partial picture of what actually oc-
curred. Instead, different bureaucratic actors competed as much as they collabo-
rated. Strategy was often highly segregated and responsive to domestic political 
pressures and priorities. Overall there appears to have been little coordinated 
political-military-economic strategy in the U.S. government in the post–Cold 
War period. 
 Managing the Murky Future 
 In many ways, we are still in the post-11/9 and 9/11 eras. Barack Obama in-
troduced his administration’s first national strategy statement in May 2010 by 
highlighting that the world is in a moment of transition, “a time of sweeping 
change,” which the United States must seek to shape. 40 The United States still 
struggles to perceive the future of a shifting and complex world in which there 
are, as John Mueller quotes, “many snakes to slay, but no dragons.” As terrifying 
as the prospect of nuclear war was during the Cold War, the Soviet threat had the 
advantage of providing an overarching focus to governmental foreign policy, a 
dominant threat around which to focus, and particular opportunities to pursue 
when possible. 
 The priority that should be assigned to different dangers and opportunities 
as we look ahead is much less clear. The United States must make sense of how 
threats from nation-states compare with dangers from terrorists; how the spread 
of nuclear weapons technologies rates in relation to the rise of global warming or 
the movement of deadly viruses; and how many resources should be devoted to 
building international institutions or alternative energy supplies versus building 
effective institutions within troubled countries abroad—or even at home. Of-
ficials must also avoid fostering Mueller’s “self-licking” threats that misrepresent 
the actual danger. 
 The authors here are agreed that how the United States plans for the future af-
fects its competence in the world arena. The policymakers—Zoellick, Wolfowitz, 
Edelman, Zelikow, and Slocombe—believe that the United States often responded 
effectively to the dramatic changes in the world over the past twenty years. They 
are certainly right in noting some achievements such as German unification, the 
expansion of NATO, and the growth of a global economy based on more open 
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markets and freer enterprise. The academicians, on the other hand, see flaws that 
have produced costly losses of treasure and lives at home and abroad. They, too, 
are right. The record has been mixed, and, to their credit, all the authors point in 
varying degrees to both achievements and mistakes in U.S. performance. 
 Looking across the chapters, patterns emerge. U.S. leaders have tended to deal 
with short-run challenges well, but have had more difficulty in managing longer-
term feedback and change. They often have relied on outdated and faulty assump-
tions. In the absence of pressing external demands, they have allowed domestic 
political pressures to skew policy; they have not effectively managed bureaucratic 
infighting; and they have not always organized an efficient policy process. Most 
of these maladies are endemic and enduring; each deserves attention. 
 There are no absolute cures, but partial remedies are possible. Awareness of 
the pathologies is an important step in itself. If policymakers understand what 
can go wrong (and right), they can avoid pitfalls and can inspire efforts to take 
compensatory actions. For example, an administration that shares Zoellick’s vi-
sion of an integrated policy could design a process that does a more effective job 
of coordinating the different policy domains. Organizational changes may also 
foster that sort of planning. Zelikow, while advising Condi Rice, was worried 
about the lack of attention to long-term planning in government. He recom-
mended that an office be established within the NSC to help bring a longer-term 
perspective to planning. 41 
 In the midst of our contemporary angst, we should not ignore some instruc-
tive lessons from the record of U.S planning since the end of the Cold War. 
Planning is not always the key source of effective action and entails its own set of 
risks. Lengthy reviews can be undermined and gutted, as seen in Bush 41’s initial 
strategic review of 1989, a review that Secretary of State Baker called “mush.” 42 
Others note the dangers of big planning exercises. Paul Wolfowitz concludes that 
“large interdepartmental reviews inevitably tend to kill innovative ideas.” 43 Edel-
man contends that “any document that must go through the bureaucratic maw 
ends up being dumbed down to the lowest common denominator.” 44 
 Yet it is also clear that improvising the nation’s foreign policy cannot endure 
for long. Focused forethought, alternative scenario consideration, and contin-
gency planning are necessary. As seen in the work of the small Rice group in 
the fall of 1989, in the labors of those crafting the Defense Planning Guidance 
between 1990 and 1993, and in the efforts of those designing the National Se-
curity Strategy of 2002, top decision makers require strategic planning, and 
policy outcomes in the long run depend, at least in part, on the quality of such 
efforts. 
 Strategy is important for developing governmental capabilities and communi-
cating purpose to audiences both within and outside of the national government. 
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Wolfowitz points out that planning is absolutely essential for making resource de-
cisions to shape U.S. military capabilities. 45 And Zoellick argues that articulating a 
coherent policy has a potent public affairs function since success may depend on 
public support both within the United States and abroad. This was the case with 
the Bush administration’s diplomacy in 1989–90, which needed the support of 
citizens in the two Germanys as well as from those in other Central and Eastern 
European countries. 46 
 Of course, the key to strategy in any U.S. administration is the president and 
other top officials who have the ability to organize and invest in a system that 
manages complexity and change in ways that mitigate the pathologies above. 
Leadership is a critical component of effective national planning. Leadership 
necessarily involves quick and decisive action, but, as Wolfowitz counsels, it must 
also allow time for strategic thinking, debate, and reflection. 
 Finally, U.S. planning under uncertainty may benefit from studying the expe-
rience of other countries. There is no question that the United States is in some 
respects a unique country as a result of its preponderant global power, particular 
democratic political system, and geographic location. Yet there are still useful 
things planners may learn from other nations in at least two respects. The first 
involves the organization and process of planning. Other nations also have to 
deal with uncertainty—indeed, in many cases, countries that are smaller and 
possess less control over the external world face even more unknowns and risks. 
Examining how they have organized themselves to deal with that complexity 
may be useful to the United States as it is increasingly intertwined with other 
countries and shaped by external factors. U.S. policymakers using intergovern-
mental networks could explore these comparative dimensions for useful insights 
relatively quickly. 
 The United States might also profit from studying how other nations extrapo-
late strategy from their planning processes. Countries around the world have had 
to deal with the threats and opportunities of a globalizing world. They too have 
had to transition away from a long-ingrained Cold War pattern of thought and 
decision making. Have some countries done better at this than others? Russia, 
the members of the EU, China, and Japan have clearly made different choices in 
terms of their emphasis on military development, the integration of security and 
economic decision making, and the priority accorded to energy and environ-
mental factors. To what extent have these choices been effective and how have 
they been shaped by planning efforts? Looking beyond the American experience 
might usefully benefit future American competence. This is a longer-term task 
that is perhaps particularly suited to scholarly research. 
 Strategy requires moving from the knowns to the unknowns and back again. 
We know that the United States today faces a world that is uncertain and complex. 
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We also know that there will be events that will occur that we cannot foresee but 
that will cause further confusion and uncertainty. 
 Our hope is that a better understanding of how the United States has reacted 
in the past will help illuminate the way forward—that has been the goal of bring-
ing together the views of former policymakers and scholars. In this book the 
personal recollections of key decision makers add significantly to the historical 
record of strategic adaptation—in ways that are both reassuring and troubling. 
The chapters by scholars provide critical analysis. Both former officials and non-
governmental experts have a role to play in improving future performance in a 
changing world fraught with peril and opportunity. 
